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LAW NOTES
APPLICATION OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA
ANTILAPSE STATUTE
The common law rule, in the absence of a statutory pro-
vision to the contrary, is that a legacy or a devise by a
testator to a person who dies after the execution of the
will but during the lifetime of the testator lapses.' A lapsed
gift will pass under a general residuary clause.2 However,
if the will contains only a limited residuary clause or none
at all, or if the lapsed gift is all or a part of the residuum, the
gift will pass as intestate property to the heirs at law and
next of kin as determined by the Statute of Descent and
Distribution.3 A devise or bequest made to a proposed ben-
eficiary who is dead at the time the will is drawn is con-
sidered at common law a void gift and it passes under the
residuary clause or as intestate property in the same manner
as a lapsed gift.4
The testator may, of course, prevent a gift from being
void or lapsing by including a substitutional provision which
allows the substituted beneficiary to take as a direct gift to
him if the primary beneficiary has died.5 If no secondary
1. Nash v. Gardner, 226 S.C. 165, 84 S.E.2d 375 (1954); Albergotti
v. Summers, 203 S.C. 137, 26 S.E.2d 395 (1943); see Karesh, Wills and
Trusts, 1955-1956 Survey of S.C. Law, 8 S.C.L.Q. 154 (1955).
2. Watson v. Wall, 229 S.C. 500, 93 S.E.2d 819 (1956); Nash v.
Gardner, supra note 1. Prior to 1858, lapsed devises could not pass
into the residuary clause but passed only as intestate property. Cheves
v. Haskell, 10 Rich. Eq. 534 (S.C. 1859). Since that time, with the
passage of § 19-231 of the S.C. Code (1962), lapsed devises may fall
into the residue. Cureton v. Massey, 13 Rich. Eq. 104 (S.C. 1866).
3. Nash v. Gardner, 226 S.C. 165, 84 S.E.2d 375 (1954); Garrett v.
Garrett, 1 Strob. Eq. 96 (S.C. 1846).
4. Dozier v. Able, 241 S.C. 358, 128 S.E.2d 682 (1962); Padgett
v. Black, 229 S.C. 142, 92 S.E.2d 153 (1956); Pegues v. Pegues,
11 Rich. Eq. 554 (S.C. 1860).
5. Cornelson v. Vance, 220 S.C. 47, 66 S.E.2d 421 (1951); Duncan
v. Harper, 4 S.C. 76 (1872). These eases are merely representative of
the numerous cases in this area. An old case which has given concern
should be pointed out at this time. In Deveaux v. Barnwell, 1 Desaus.
Eq. 497 (S.C. 1796), the testator left property to his wife in fee, and
what she did not dispose of was to go equally among the children.
Two of the testator's children died after the execution of the testator's
will and during his lifetime. It would appear from these facts that in
absence of an antilapse statute or an expressed substitutional clause,
the gift to the two predeceased children failed and either went to the
surviving children or was to be distributed as intestate property depend-
ing on whether a class gift or individual gifts had been created. How-
ever, the court allowed the children of the testator's two deceased
children to take the share of their parents stating that there is a strong
presumption that the testator meant for his grandchildren to stand in
1
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beneficiary has been named and the primary beneficiary dies,
a codicil may prevent the gift from failing.6
The English Statute of Wills of 1837 was designed to
abrogate some of the harshness of the common law lapse
by allowing a gift which would have otherwise lapsed to pass
to issue of the deceased beneficiary, as the testator in all
probability thought that it would.7  The English statute
has been strictly construed to prevent only what would have
been a common law lapse.8
Nearly all states have passed an antilapse statute or lapse
statute, as it is sometimes called, in one form or another.,
The South Carolina antilapse statute provides as follows:
If any child should die in the lifetime of the father
or mother, leaving issue, any legacy of personalty or
devise of real estate given in the last will of such father
or mother shall go to such issue, unless such deceased
the place of their parents. Although this case has never been expressly
overruled, its validity is to be highly questioned. It seems opposed to the
rule that a gift to children does not include grandchildren. Black v.
Gettys, 238 S.C. 167 119 S.E.2d 660 (1961); Jones v. Holland, 223 S.C.
500, 77 S.E.2d 202 (1953); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 1242 (1950).
6. MIcLaurin v. Newton, 183 S.C. 379, 191 S.E. 59 (1937); Dent v.
Dent, 113 S.C. 416, 102 S.E. 715 (1919). In these cases a lapse was
prevented by republication and not by express substitution. However,
republication may not necessarily be for the purpose of preventing a
lapse. Coffin v. Elliott, 9 Rich. Eq. 244 (S.C. 1857).
7. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c.26 §33. The aptilapse statute
provided:
That where any person being a child or other issue of the
testator to whom any real or personal estate sball be devised
or bequeathed for any estate or interest not determinable at
or before the death of such person shall die in the lifetime
of the testator leaving issue, and such issue of such person
shall be living at the time of the death of the testator, such
devise or bequest shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if
the death of such person had happened immediately after
the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall
appear by the will.
8. In re Harvey's Estate, 1 Ch. 567 (1893); Qlney v, Bates, 3 Drew
3M, 61 Eng. Rep. 920 (Ch. 1855).
9. It ppears that all but four states - Hawaii, Louisiana, New
MeFico and Wyoming * have some fQ9m of an" apse prpvision. The
wording in the antilapse statutes describig the reJtionphip of the
claimants to the testator necessary in order tQ fall within the purview
of the statute is not uniform. In pine states the antilapse statute
applies only where the devisee or legatee is a lineal deseenant of the
testator. This group would include South Carolina althogh it is limited
to the testator's children. AnQter groqp of states, 28 in number,
apply the lapse statute whpere the levjee or jegAtee is "relgted to the
testator, but some of these states limit it to certain specifiqa relatives,
A third group of states, nine in number, have lapse stat~tes which
apply to all cases in which a devisee or legatee predeceases the testator.
See Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA.L.REv. 856, at 899 (1960).
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child was equally portioned with the other children by
the father or mother when living.10
The application of the antilapse statute has been upheld
under the facts in only one case" before the South Carolina
Supreme Court, while it has been rejected as not applicable
under the facts in seven cases.' 2 The language of the lapse
statute is limited to a greater degree than that of most
states, the majority of which do not limit it to a gift made
to the child of the testator.13 The court in Logan v. Brun-
soi' 4 stated that the statute allows the issue of the ben-
eficiary to take the share of its or their parents only if:
(1) the legacy or devise was given to the child by the will
of his father or mother; (2) the child has died during the
lifetime of the testator; (3) and the child has not been
equally portioned with the other children by the father or
mother.
SOUTH CAROLINA CASES
HOLDING THE STATUTE INAPPLICABLE
The cases which have arisen under the lapse statute seem
to indicate the court's belief that it should be construed
strictly just as the English statute has been construed.
10. S.C. CODE §19-237 (1962). The first South Carolina antilapse pro-
vision appeared as early as 1789.
11. Mathis v. Hammond, 9 Rich. Eq. 137 (S.C. 1856).
12. Padgett v. Black, 229 S.0. 142, 92 S.E.2d 153 (1956); Suber
v. Nash, 84 S.C. 12, 65 S.E. 947 (1909); Logan v. Brunson, 56 S.C.
7, 33 S.E. 737 (1899); Roundtree v. Roundtree, 26 S.C. 450, 2 S.E.
474 (1887); Pratt v. McGhee, 17 S.C. 428 (1882); Duncan v. Harper,
supra note 5; Pegues v. Pegues, 11 Rich. Eq. 554 (S.C. 1860). Other
South Carolina cases have mentioned the antilapse statute but it played
no part in the decision. See also Citizens & So. Nat. Bank of S. C.
v. Cleveland, 200 S.C. 373, 20 S.E.2d 811 (1942), and Rasor v. Rasor,
173 S.C. 365, 175 S.E. 545 (1934). The antilapse statute was not
cited in these two cases but the facts were such that its application
could have been raised. In the former case a trust was involved. Generally
the lapse statutes in other states have been held applicable to the
interest of a beneficiary under a trust who dies before the testator
leaving issue. Annot., 118 A.L.R. 559 (1939). An exception to this
rule usually results upon a showing that the trust was personal in
nature or that the particular purpose for which it was established has
been abrogated by the death of the trust beneficiary in the testator's
lifetime. 57 AMJUR., Wills §1435 at 964 (1948). It is probable
that under the facts of the Cleveland case, the antilapse statute, even
if argued, would not have changed the result due to the personal nature
of the testamentary trust. In Rasor v. Rasor, the court allowed the
children of a beneficiary, the testator's son who was "civiliter mortuus,"
take the share of the parent relying completely on §19-5 of the S.C. CODE
(1962), without the necessity of resorting to the antilapse statute.
13. See note 9 supra.
14. 56 S.C. 7, 33 S.E. 737 (1899).
930 [Vol. 15
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In Pegues v. Pegues'5 the testator died in 1857 leaving
a will executed in 1852. In the second clause of the will he
gave to one of his sons, Malachi Pegues, $1,500.00 and in the
twelfth clause he gave the rest to all his children to be equally
divided among them, share and share alike. The son, Malachi
Pegues, died in 1849 before the execution of the will and his
children claimed his share. The court, in holding that the
antilapse statute had no application, said:
It may be very well conceived that it intended to make
good a legacy which had become void, without going
the length of supposing it intended to give effect to
one which was void ab initio.
The court further stated:
The construction which has been generally put upon
the statute, has been that it was intended to prevent
the consequences of lapse arising from the death of the
legatee after the execution of the will.
Later cases have upheld the view that the lapse statute
has no application if the testator's child dies before the will
is executed1 6 and the fact that the testator had knowledge of
the beneficiarfs death does not alter the result.'7
In Pratt v. McGhee's the testator devised his real estate
to his son who died after the execution of the will but during
the lifetime of the testator. At that time the lapse statute
provided that the issue of the deceased beneficiary would take
any legacy given in the last will of the father or mother. The
court held that the word "legacy" was used in its technical
sense and did not include a devise of land. Within the follow-
ing year, 1883, the legislature amended the statute to include
a devise of real estate as well as a legacy of personalty.19
In Logan v. Brunson20 the testator gave his property to
his wife for life, remainder to his daughter, Mary C. Brown,
for life, remainder to her children in fee. Sarah Brown, a
daughter of Mary C. Brown and a granddaughter of the tes-
15. 11 Rich. Eq. 554 (S.C. 1860).
16. Padgett v. Black, 229 S.C. 142, 92 S.E.2d 153 (1956); Suber v.
Nash, 84 S.C. 12, 65 S.E. 947 (1909); Duncan v. Harper, 4 S.C. 76 (1872).
17. Padgett v. Black, 229 S.C. 142, 92 S.E.2d 153 (1956).
18. 17 S.C. 428 (1882).
19. S.C. CODE §19-237 (1962).
20. 56 S.C. 7, 33 S.E. 737 (1899).
1963]
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tator, died after the execution of the will and during the
lifetime of the testator, and her children claimed the share
which she would have received had she outlived the testator.
The court held that the provisions of the lapse statute applied
only to a gift by a parent to his child and could not be ex-
tended to embrace the great grandchildren of the testator
in the face of the express language of the statute.
The court in Padgett v. Black21 reached the obvious result
that the antilapse statute is not broad enough to provide for
children of a deceased beneficiary who was a nephew of the
testatrix.
WORDS OF SURVIVORSHIP
The lapse statute has been uniformly held in other juris-
dictions to have no application if the testator indicates in
his will that he did not intend for it to be applied.22 How-
ever, most states require that the contrary intent on the part
of the testator must be plainly indicated before the statute
is rendered inoperative.
23
If a survivorship clause is contained in the will and is
construed to relate to the death of the testator, the courts
have uniformly held that since the gift is contingent upon
the donee surviving the testator, the death of the legatee or
devisee during the lifetime of the testator defeats the gift
to that particular deceased donee, and failure of the condition
defeats the gift so that there is nothing upon which the
lapse statute can operate.24 The manifestation of the clear
intention of the testator to substitute another person clearly
rules out the application of the lapse statute.
25
If the language relates to the members surviving the
execution of the will, this construction would not prohibit
the statute from applying to persons who died after the
execution of the will and before the testator.
26
21. 229 S.C. 142, 92 S.E.2d 153 (1956).
22. Re Mott, 137 Misc. 99, 244 N.Y.S. 187 (1930). See generally
Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1172 (1959); Annot., 92 A.L.R. 846 (1934).
23. Re Steidi's Estate, 89 Cal. App.2d 448, 201 P.2d 58 (1948);
Re Gerdes' Estate, 245 Iowa 778, 62 N.W.2d 777 (1954); Rivenett v.
Bourquin, 53 Mich. 10, 18 N.W. 537 (1884).
24. Galloupe v. Blake, 248 Mass. 196, 142 N.E. 818 (1924); Wallace
v. Diehl, 202 N.Y. 156, 95 N.E. 646 (1911).
25. Strong v. Smith, 84 Mich. 567, 48 N.W. 183 (1891); Converse
v. Byars, 112 Mont. 372, 118 P.2d 144 (1941).
26. Gale v. Keyes, 45 Ohio App. 61, 186 N.E. 755 (1933).
[Vol. 15
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The Illinois Court 27 has taken the position that the word
"surviving" may relate to the time when the gift vests in
enjoyment and possession at some time subsequent to the
testator's death. Under these circumstances the lapse statute
was applied, and the court held that the requirement of
survival became significant only after the death of the tes-
tator and prior to the period of distribution.
If all the beneficiaries predecease the testator, there is
authority for the view that the statute should operate since
the survivorship requirement is applicable only where one
survives and the testator did not contemplate or provide
for the case where none of the beneficiaries survive.
2 8
JOINT TENANCY
The right of persons to hold real or personal property
as joint tenants has not been abolished in South Carolina. 29
Although the right of survivorship, one of the incidents of
a joint tenancy, has been abolished by statute,80 the statute
does not apply if the interest of the beneficiary has not
vested.31 Therefore, a gift by the testator to his named chil-
dren as joint tenants would result in the survivor or sur-
vivors taking the share of the deceased child who died during
the testator's lifetime unless the antilapse statute allowed the
issue of the deceased to take his share. Although there seem
to be few cases dealing with this subject, the better rule
would appear to be that the lapse statute has no application
as shown by the case of Campbell v. Clark32 in which the
New Hampshire court said:
If a devise be to two or more and to the survivor
of them, or to be held by them as joint tenants .... and
one dies in the testator's lifetime leaving issue, a
holding that such issue takes under the statute as the
parent would have taken had he survived would defeat
the expressed intention of the testator.
27. Schneller v. Schneller, 356 Ill. 89, 190 N.E. 121 (1934); Burlet
v. Burlet, 246 Ill. 563, 92 N.E. 965 (1910).
28. Galloupe v. Blake, 248 Mass. 196, 142 N.E. 818 (1924); In re
Burns' Estate, 78 S.D. 223, 100 N.W.2d 399 (1960).
29. Ball v. Deas, 2 Strob. Eq. 24 (S.C. 1884); Herbemont v. Thomas,
Cheves Eq. 21 (1839).
30. S.C. CODE §19-55 (1962).
31. Ball v. Deas, 2 Strob. Eq. 24 (S. C. 1884); Herbemont v. Thomas,
Cheves Eq. 21 (1839).
32. Campbell v. Clark, 64 N.H. 328, 10 Atl. 702 (1887).
1963]
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 5 [1963], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss5/4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
The court further states:
The statute does not apply to the case of a gift to
several persons as joint tenants; for, as the share of
any object dying in the testator's lifetime would survive
to the other or others, such event occasions no lapse,
to prevent which is the avowed object of the lapse
statute.
The writer has been able to find only one case in which
the lapse statute has been applied to a joint tenancy.33
Other states are not faced with the same problem that
South Carolina has in this area, as most states adopted at
an early date statutes designed to reverse the common law's
preference for joint tenancies, thereby facilitating the owner-
ship by tvo or more persons, particularly in relation to the
free alienability of real property.3 4 This, along with the
fact that many states have abolished joint tenancy (and in
other states where it has not been abolished it is not looked
upon favorably), is perhaps the reason why the cases con-
cerning the application of the lapse statute to such an estate
are so scarce.
However, since South Carolina does not have a statute
which gives a preference to the creation of a tenancy in
common, the problem may well arise in this state.35 The
court in Telfair v. Howe 8 states that the right of survivor-
ship in almost every instance defeats the intention of the
testator and if there are any words or implication in the will
which indicates an intention not to create a joint tenancy, it
will give effect to that intention. Nevertheless, some words
indicating a tenancy in common must be present or a joint
tenancy will be presumed to have been the testator's inten-
tion. 7 Thus a gift to A and B, nothing else appearing,
would be a joint tenancy and A would take the entire gift
if B died before the testator.
8 8
33. Hoke v. Hoke, 12 W.Va. 427 (1887). The antilapse statute was
applied to a gift to joint tenants so as to abrogate the rule of survivor-
ship which would be applied in its absence.
34. In re Walker's Will, 195 Misc. 793, 89 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1949).
35. Ball v. Deas, 2 Strob. Eq. 24 (S.C. 1884); Herbemont v. Thomas,
Cheves Eq. 21 (1839).
36. 3 Rich. Eq. 235 (S.C. 1851). See also Free v. Sandifer, 131 S.C.
232, 126 S.E. 521 (1925).
37. Ball v. Deas, 2 Strob. Eq. 24 (S.C. 1884); Herbemont v. Thomas,
Cheves Eq. 21 (1839).
38. Ibid. It logically follows that a devise or bequest made to the
testator's children as a class without words indicating that the class
[Vol. 15
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There is seeming authority in this state for the view that
a joint tenancy can be created with the incident of survivor-
ship notwithstanding the statute abolishing survivorship if
the suvivorship provisions are expressed.39 It would seem
in this instance that there is definitely no room for the
application of the antilapse statute since the testator has
expressly made his intention lmown.
CLASS GIFTS
Before reaching the problem of the application of the
antilapse statute to class gifts, the first step should be to
determine just when a gift to a class has been made.
In Jones v. Holland40 the court cites the common defini-
tion used by the majority of states, that "A gift to persons
as a class is a gift of an aggregate sum to a body of persons
uncertain in number at the time of the gift, to be ascer-
tained at a future time."4 1 This definition, although cited
frequently, is not of much help, and almost every case that
quotes it adds that when a limitation does not come within
its requirements, a clear showing of the testator's intent to
give to a class will control in any event. It has been stated
that the definition is simply an attempt to generalize the
situations in which courts will find that the testator's wishes
were such that a class will best effectuate them.
42
The basic inquiry, therefore, should be to determine what
the testator intended should happen if a person, who other-
wise would take as a beneficiary, predeceased him. Since
the testator does not always reveal his intention in clear and
unambiguous terms, the courts attempt to provide an answer
on the basis of such inferences as are reasonably deducible
from the language used in describing the beneficiaries. 43
members were to take as tenants in common would result in a joint
tenancy. Even assuming the antilapse statute applied to class gifts,
discussed later in this article, the court in this situation would be
faced with the additional legal issue of whether the antilapse statute
abrogates the incident of survivorship if one of the joint tenants dies
before the gift has vested.
39. Austin v. Summers, 237 S.C. 613, 118 S.E.2d 684 (1961); Davis
v. Davis, 223 S.C. 182, 75 S.E.2d 46 (1953). See Karesh, Wills and
Trusts, 1960-1961 Survey of S.C. Law, 14 S.C.L.Q. 227 (1962).
40. 223 S.C. 500, 77 S.E.2d 202 (1953).
41. JARmAN, Wn.Ls §310 (7th Am. ed. 1930). This definition has
been criticized in Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 219 at 221 (1958), and RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY §279 Comment e (1940).
42. Cooley, What Constitutes a Gift to a Class, 49 HAXS.L.RE. 903
at 926 (1936).
43. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 219 (1958); Annot., 75 A.L.R. 774 (1931).
1963] 935
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If the testator merely identifies the beneficiaries with a
group designation, i.e., "to the children of A," it is gen-
erally presumed that he is group minded and the reasonable
inference which can be drawn from this fact is that he wished
all those who survive to take the complete gift.4" However,
if the language supports the conclusion that he treated the
beneficiaries as separate and distinct individuals, the in-
ference to be drawn is that he did not intend for the others
to profit by the death.45 The authority seems clear in this
state that, if there is a collective gift to named persons
described as a class, an individual gift was contemplated by
the testator in absence of contrary language; accordingly, a
lapse will result if one of the named beneficiaries dies before
the testator.46 The courts generally hold that a mention of
the number of persons Who are to take the gift has the effect
of indicating An individual gift,47 but the fact that the tes-
tator makes a gift "in equal proportions among all his grand-
children" apparently is not sufficient to individualize the
gift.48
Since the lapse statute in this state applies only when
A gift has been made by a parent to his child, the question
involved is whether a gift by the testator "to my children"
constitutes a class or individual gift. Although a gift to
the children of another is generally held to be a class gift
unless there is language implying a contrary intention, a gift
by the testator to his own children, not named, is said to
create an ambiguity as to whether the testator was thinking
of them as individuals or as a class. 49
44. Casner, Class Gifts, Effect of Failure of Class Member to Survive
the Testator, 60 HARv.L.RSv. 751 (1946).
45. Ibid.
46. Nash v. Gardner, 226 S.C. 165, 84 S.E.2d 375 (1954); Kirldand
v. Moseley, 109 S.C. 477, 96 S.E. 608 (1918). See also Wilmeth, Class
Gifts in South Carolina, 9 Selden Society Year Book 16 (1947).
47. Wessborg v. Merrill, 195 Mich. 556, 162 N.W. 102 (1917); Dela-
field v. Shipman, 103 N.Y. 463, 9 N.E. 184 (1886).
48. Logan v. Brunson, 56 S.C. 7, 33 S.E. 737 (1899). See RESTATF-
ME NT, PRO1ERTY § 282, Comment b (1940). In Suber v. Nash, 84 S.C.
12, 65 S.E. 947 (1909), the testatrix made a gift, "share and share
alike amongst all of my children." In a previous item in the will the
testatrix had named her five children and in a subsequent item the
executor wvas directed to divide the gift "amongst all the children
aforesaid." The court held that "all of my children" meant the same
as "all of my children aforesaid" and as the children were previously
named in the will, and the name of the deceased child was not among
them, there was no intention to give anything to him.
49. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 219 (1958); Annot., 75 A.L.R. 774 (1931).
936 [Vol. 15
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In In re RusseUl50 the New York Court held that a bequest
to the "widoW and children" of the testator constituted an
individual gift to each in the absence of clear language
indicating g gift to them as a body or a class.
Due to this conflict, it should not be taken for granted
that since the testator did not name or number his children
a class gift has been created when the gift has been made
to his "children, share and share alike" or words of similar
import. It is arguable that his refusal to name them was
for the sake of convenience only.
Assuming that the testator has made a gift to his children
as a class, the problem arising is one which South Carolina
has never been squarely faced with and one that has not
been handled uniformly by other jurisdictions.
THE MINORITY RULE
The states which have refused to apply the antilapse
statute to class gifts have used two approaches, referred to
as the "intintion approach" and the "lapse approach. ' 51
The "intention approach" is based upon the idea that
the testator intended only that those persons who answered
the description of the class at the time of his death should
take. 2 Since the predeceased child does not answer the
description, his issue calinot take because the antilapse stat-
ute could not give the issue what the parent was not intended
to take.53 This approach follows the settled rule of construc-
tion that where the devise is to a class, membership in the
class is usually ascertained at the time of the testator's
death and only those coming within the description at that
time are members of the class.54 The courts which apply the
statute state that this rule of construction has been modified
by the legislature through the antilapse statute, as the com-
mon law rule did not express the true intention of the tes-
tator.r5
50. 168 N.Y. 169, 61 N.E. 166 (1901).
51. Casner, supra note 44, at 758.
52. Campbell v. Clark, 64 N.H. 328, 10 Atl. 702 (1887).
53. Morris v. Bolles, 65 Conn. 45, 31 At. 538 (1894). However,
the court later reversed its holding and applied the lapse statute to
a class gift in Clifford v. Cronin, 97 Conn. 434, 117 AtI. 489 (1922).
See Martin v. Mereer Univ., 98 Ga. 320, 25 S.E. 522 (1896); Campbell
v. Clark, 64 N.H. 328, 10 Ati. 702 (1887).
54. Jones v. Holland, 223 S.C. 500, 77 S.E.2d 202 (1953).
55. Galloupe v. Blake, 248 Mass. 196, 142 N.E. 818 (1924); Howland
v. Slade, 155 Mass. 415, 29 N.E. 631 (1892).
9371963] LAW NOTES
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The "lapse approach" is grounded on the theory that the
statute was designed to prevent a common law lapse and
should be strictly construed as such, since any statute which
is in derogation of the common law deserves a strict con-
struction.58 In a class gift there is no technical lapse since
the share which the deceased class member would have
received does not lapse but goes to the surviving class
members.
57
A minority of the states which have had occasion to de-
cide the problem have done so using either one or both of
these approaches without showing a distinction in many
cases, as both approaches are grounded on the same legal
principle, i.e. the time when the class is ascertained.58
THE MAJORITY RULE
A majority of the courts have applied the antilapse statute
to class gifts if the class member died after the execution
of the will and during the lifetime of the testator.59 These
56. Johns v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 206 Ga. 313, 56 S.E.
182 (1950); Redinbaugh v. Redinbaugh, 199 Iowa 1053, 203 N.W.
246 (1925); Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Sibbits, 62 N.J. Eq.
131, 49 Atl. 530 (Ch. 1901); In re Harvey's Estate, 1 Ch. 567 (1893).
57. Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Sibbits, suprm note 56; In
re Warren's Will, 176 S.C. 455, 180 S.E. 458 (1935).
58. Martin v. Mercer Univ., 98 Ga. 320, 25 S.E. 522 (1896) ; Friederichs
v. Friederichs, 205 Iowa 505, 218 N.W. 271 (1928); Lacy v. Murdock,
147 Neb. 242, 22 N.W.2d 713 (1946); Campbell v. Clark, 64 N.H. 328,
10 Atl. 702 (1887); In re Guering's Estate, 206 Misc. 850, 133
N.Y.S.2d 253 (Surr. Ct. 1954). Maryland and Tennessee held that
the statute had no application to class gifts until their lapse statutes
were subsequently amended to include class gifts. See Weaver v. Mc-
Gonigall, 170 Md. 212, 183 Atl. 544 (1936), and Jones v. Hunt, 96
Tenn. 369, 34 S.W. 693 (1896). For a complete list of cases in this
area see Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948 (1957).
59. In re Steidi's Estate, 89 Cal. App.2d 488, 201 P.2d 58 (1948);
Clifford v. Cronin, 97 Conn. 434, 117 Atl. 489 (1922); Drafts v. Drafts,
Fla. App. -, 114 So.2d 473 (1959); Kehl v. Taylor, 273 Ill. 346,
114 N.E. 125 (1916); Moses v. Allen, 81 Me. 268, 17 AtI. 66 (1889);
Galloupe v. Blake, 248 Mass. 196, 142 N.E. 818 (1924); Strong v.
Smith, 84 Mich. 567, 48 N.W. 183 (1891); In re Kittson's Estate,
177 Minn. 469, 225 N.W. 439 (1929); Zombro v. Moffett, 329 Mo.
137, 44 S.W.2d 149 (1931); Wooley v. Paxson, 46 Ohio St. 307, 24
N.E. 599 (1888); Williams v. Knight, 18 R.I. 333, 27 AtI. 210 (1893);
Hoverstad v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 76 S.D. 119, 74 N.W.2d
48 (1955); Burch v. McMillin, 15 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929);
In re Hutton's Estate, 106 Wash. 578, 180 Pac. 882 (1919) (dictum);
Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 54 W.Va. 681, 46 S.E. 150 (1903) (dictum).
In some of the above cases the devisee or legatee died before the
execution of the will, but it generally follows that if the court applies
it in this instance, they will also apply the antilapse statute when
the beneficiary dies after the execution of the will. For a complete
list of cases see Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948 (1957).
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courts take the view that it is a remedial statute and should
be liberally construed. 60 The reasoning is the testator most
probably intended or expected that the deceased beneficiary's
share would be distributed to his issue, as any other rule
would result in an unequal distribution of the testator's
property among the objects of his affection. 61 In Strong V.
Smith6 2 the Michigan Court said that the evident intent of
the legislature was not to prevent lapses in general, but to
provide for the kindred of the testator.
In eight states the legislature has adopted specific pro-
visions declaring that the lapse statute applies to class gifts.63
No states have provisions expressly excluding the operation
of the lapse statute to class gifts.
DEATH OF BENEFICIARY BEFORE EXECUTION OF THE WILL
A majority of jurisdictions refuse to apply the antilapse
statute to class gifts where the class member was deceased
prior to the execution of the will. 64 The reasoning of the
various courts which adopt this view can be divided roughly
into three categories: (1) those courts which adopt the
common law "lapse approach" and refuse to apply the lapse
statute to any class gifts;65 (2) those courts which follow
the "intent approach" and hold that the testator could not
have intended persons deceased at the time of the execution
of the will to share as class members;66 (3) those courts
which follow the common law rule that a gift to an already
deceased beneficiary is void, reasoning that a statute pre-
venting lapse cannot prevent a gift from being void. 7
A minority of states giving a liberal reading to the statute
apply it to void gifts68 while a few states have provisions
60. Kehl v. Taylor, supra note 59.
61. Wooley v. Paxson, 46 Ohio St. 307, 24 N.E. 599 (1888).
62. 84 Mich. 567, 48 N.W. 183 (1891).
63. Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA.L.REv. 856 at 901 (1960).
These states include Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia.
64. Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948 (1957).
65. Davie v. Wynn, 80 Ga. 673, 6 S.E. 183 (1888).
66. Campbell v. Clark, 64 N.H. 328, 10 Atl. 702 (1887); Wescott v.
Higgins, 42 App. Div. 69, 58 N.Y.S. 938 (1899).
67. Clifford v. Cronin, 97 Conn. 434, 117 At]. 489 (1922); Howland
v. Slade, 155 Mass. 415, 29 N.E. 631 (1892).
68. Kehl v. Taylor, 273 Ill. 346, 114 N.E. 125 (1916); Bray v. Pullen,
84 Me. 185, 24 At. 811 (1892); Shumaker v. Person, 67 Ohio St. 330,
65 N.E. 1005 (1902). In Wildberger v. Cheek's Ex'r, 94 Va. 517,
12
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stating that the statute applies to a devisee or legatee who
is dead at the time the will is executed.6 9
CONCLUSION
This law note has been the product of an attempt to point
out some of the circumstances which may prevent the opera-
tion of the antilapse statute in this state, with the overall
objective of determining its effect upon class gifts.
If and when the problem arises wherein a testator has
made a gift to his children, and a child predeceases the
testator leaving issue, the problem should be approached by
first asking these five questions:
1. Is it a class gift?
2. When did the class member die?
3. Are words of survivorship present or any language
indicating an intention of the testator contrary to that of
the antilapse statute?
4. Are there words creating a tenancy in common or is it
a joint tenancy?
5. Will the antilapse statute be applied to class gifts in
this state?
These questions are answered or commented upon in order:
1. As previously pointed out the gift may be construed
as an individual one if the children are named, numbered,
mentioned somewhere else in the will by name, or possibly
even if not named or numbered at all.
2. It seems clear that the South Carolina antilapse statute
would not protect the issue of an otherwise class member
who died before the will was executed.
27 S.E. 441 at 443 (1897), the court said, "The statute has regard
rather to the class of individuals for whose relief it is interposed than
to any technical distinction in the -manner of the failure against which
it proposes to guard them."
69. See Hash v. Hash, 64 Mont. 118, 208 Pac. 605 (1922). The
amendment was passed after the death of the testator and the court
refused to apply the original statute stating that to do so would be to
usurp the powers of the legislature. But see Drafts v. Drafts, So.2d 473
(Fla.App. 1959), in which the court refused to apply the lapse statute
to an already deceased beneficiary even though the statute contained the
words " ... or is dead at the time the will is executed . . ." FLA. STAT.
§_731.20 (1957). Also see Nash, Wills, Application of Florida Antilapse
Statute to Class Gifts, 14 U.MiAmt L.Rnv. 702 (1959).
[Vol. 15
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3. The statute will not operate if there is language in
the will clearly showing that the testator intended the gift
to pass in a manner contrary to that proposed by it.
4. It appears evident in this state that words indicating
an intention to create a tenancy in common must be present
before such an estate can come into being. If a joint tenancy
exists, the better rule would seem to be that there is no
room for the operation of the antilapse statute since not
only is there no lapse but there is also no language present
in the antilapse statute indicating the legislature's intention
to abolish the effect of a joint tenancy on a gift which has
not vested.
5. An opinion of the writer as to the probable answer
which the South Carolina Supreme Court will give to the
question of whether the antilapse statute applies to class
gifts would be purely speculative and based on the slight
inferences which can be gathered from a reading of the few
cases construing the antilapse statute in this state. There
is no question in this writer's mind that the equitable and
just result would be to allow the issue of the predeceased
child to take his share, but there is also the conviction that
the South Carolina statute was enacted strictly for the pur-
pose of preventing a common law lapse, and any broader
application would be an invasion of the province of the
legislature. Although the South Carolina antilapse statute
does not mention the word lapse, as some of the statutes in
other states do, the early cases clearly placed this construc-
tion upon it. In Pegues v. Pegues70 it was said, "the con-
struction which has been generally put upon the statute, has
been that it was intended to prevent a lapse arising from
the death of the legatee after the execution of the will."
(Emphasis added.) There is the further statement that "it
was intended to make good a legacy which had become void."
A class gift never lapses or becomes void unless all the class
members die during the lifetime of the testator.
In addition, it was stated in Suber v. Nas 7 1 that there
must be an intention to give the deceased child a legacy or
devise before the antilapse statute can operate. No gift has
70. 11 Rich. Eq. 554 (S.C. 1850).
71. 84 S.C. 12, 65 S.E. 947 (1909).
19631
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been made to a child who merely fits into the description of
a class unless he is living at the death of the testator.
To read into the statute a modification of these common
law rules of construction is to allow one's concept of justice
and equality as to what should have been done to interfere
with the reality of what was done by the legislature.
It is this writer's opinion that the antilapse statute should
be amended, but until that occurs, if ever, the draftsmen
of wills should continue either to name the children or ex-
pressly state that the children of a deceased child should
take the parent's share - a practice which is a common one.
WLLIAm M. HAGOOD III
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